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Sectoral Models of the Welfare State
SECTOR MODELS OF THE WELFARE STATE:
A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS
Stanley DeViney
University of Kansas
Mid-American Review of Sociology, 1987, Vol. XII, No. 2:3-20
Past comparative research on the welfare state has focused
on the problem of general overall development using a
summary indicator of all major programs. This paper tests
the ap plicabilty of models of welfare state development to
five subsets of welfare-state programs: 1) old-age pensions;
2) disability pensions; 3) worker compensation;
4) une m ployment compensation; and 5) sick benefits.
Analysis of a sample of 18 Western industrial nations shows
that no single model of the welfare state fits all five
subsectors. The paper concludes that individual programs
within the welfare state are a response to particular needs
and/or demands and not the result of a uniform set of
factors.
Past comparative research on welfare-state! development has
focused on general overall development using a summary indicator
of all major programs (Cutright, 1965; Wilensky, 1975, 1981; Castles
and McKinlay, 1979). The use of a single, inclusive indictor of
welfare state policy is justified by the assumptions that sector
variation is minimal and that programs are interdependent and
integra ted responses to one of several sets of factors: (1) a response
to problems of general economic development; (2) an outcome of
working-class demands; or (3) an immediate consequence of state
structures.f 'On the basis of "this research, conclusions are made
that the welfare state, as a whole, is predominately a result of a
single set of factors drawn from one perspective.
Only recently has attention turned to models of individual
programs (Pampel and Williamson, 1985; DeViney, 1984; Myles,
1984) and the possibility of program differentiation within the
welfare state (Coughlin and Armour, 1983; Schneider, 1982;
Shalev, 1983). This growing in terest in subsections of the welfare
state presents the possibility that individual elements of welfare-
state programs need not be the outcome of a single set of factors.
Rather, subsets of programs may be a response to different factors
that do not neccesarily affect other subsets.
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Reliance on either an indicator of overall welfare-state
development or on a single program area may mask the influence
of factors that are specific to particular subsets of the welfare
state. The purpose of this paper is to test the competing models of
the welfare state in the context of overall expenditures and
income replacement indicators for five risk areas: (1) old-age;
(2) disability; (3) work injury; (4) unemployment; and (5) illness.
The research takes the form of a cross-sectional analysis of
eighteen industrial, capitalist narions." The use of indicators from
more than one program area allows for the determination of
influences of factors from competing models on subsets of welfare
programs as well as general overall development.
MODELS OF THE WELFARE ST ATE
Most studies of the modern welfare state have used one of three
general models. Each makes the claim that it explains the welfare
state as a whole, but each may be related to only a subset of
programs covered under the umbrella of the welfare state. The
present analysis begins with an overview of each model of the
welfare state and explanations for why the models may be related
to only discrete sectors and not the welfare state as a whole.
The industrialization model of the welfare state presents
social programs as a responses to the needs and problems arising
from structural change in the economy. This perspective is rooted
in a Durkheimian, structural-functional view of societal
development (Flora and Alber, 1981:38) that stresses the causal
interrelationship between economic and population growth and
social-structural differen tiation.
In the course of economic development societies are
confronted with problems and, in turn, develop solutions 0 for those
problems (Wilensky, 1975). The foremost of" these problems is the
decline of integration resulting from the disruption and decay of
traditional structures in the context of an elaborated division of
labor. "The welfare state may be understood as an attempt to
create a new kind of solidarity in highly differentiated societies
and as an attempt to respond to problems in the division of labor"
(Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981:22). The uncertainties created by a
market economy and a mobile labor force can no longer be
regulated by older, smaller social units. In the place of smaller
integrative units, for example the family, public bureaucracies are
forced to step in and regulate the division of labor (Wilensky and
Lebeaux, 1958; Kerr et aI., 1964:67).
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Correla~ed with thi~ underlying "logic of industrialism" (Kerr
et. aI., 1964), IS a .change In the age composition of the population
WIth a greatly Increased proportion of older persons in society
(Hauser, 1976:59). The welfare state is to a large degree a welfare
stat~ for the aged (Myles, 1984), with a majority of programs
having the eld.erly ~s their target population. For example, within
the ~et of nations Included within this analysis, public old-age
pe~sIons account for 52.7_ percent of all benefit expenditures for
SOCIal programs (I~O, 1981): Any ~ncrease in. the number of elderly
would lead to an Increase In SOCIal expenditures (Wilensky, 1975,
198 I; Aaron, 1967). Therefore, the presence of a rela ti vely large
number of elderly creates the need for larger expenditures.
The existence of a large elderly population may be
interpreted as a political demand for welfare-state programs as
well as a need for greater expenditures (Pampel and Williamson,
198.5~. A large aged population desiring higher benefits becomes a
pol.itical force supportive of the welfare state. Thus, demographic
change congruent with industrialization leads to a political demand
for welfare-s!ate programs, as well as to a need for those programs.
The evidence that this model applies to some but not all
welfar~-state programs can be found in previous research.
Coughlin and Armour (1983)~ in a factor analysis of OECD nations
re~ort that pension expenditures are the most demographicall;
driven program, responding to changes in the number of elderly.
But othe~ progra.m e.xp~nditures, for example unemployment, were
not associated WIth indicators of industrialization and its related
changes. Flora and Alber (1981) present a sequence pattern in the
adoption. of a social insurance system, with each program
representing a further movement away from classical liberalism
and t~ward greater intervention by the state in the economy. The
adoprton of each subset of programs covering new areas of risk
represents a different stage in the development of the welfarestare .
and may be a response to a different set of demands and needs
(Schneider, 1982).
The second model of the welfare state, the social democratic
model, ta~es iss~e .wit? the apolitical analysis of public policy
unde~ the In~ustrialization theses. While industrialization may be
assocI~ted WIth structural changes that weaken pre-existing means
of ~oclaI Support, .the change need not translate directly into public
POlICY. and pU.bl.Ic expenditures without a corresponding, and
effectI~e, pol i t i ca l pressure. Central to this more political
concepnon of the welfare state are the assumptions that welfare
programs are distributional issues (Castles and McKinlay, 1979;
Myles, 1984; Shalev, 1983), and tha t the comprehension of
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distribution policy requires an accounting of the relative power of
economic classes (Korpi, 1983; Hicks and Swank, 1984).
Shalev (1983:319-320) presents four basic propositions of this
model as it pertains to the welfare state in general. First, that the
welfare state is a class issue and its principal proponent is the
working class. The programs labeled as part of the welfare state
transfer income (Castles and McKinlay, 1979) and reduce working-
class dependency on the labor market (Espring-Andersen, 1981:2).
Second, that policy is defined by the choice of elected government
officials in political democracy and is not a reflection of general
structural needs. Third, that the most significant political cleavage
is between working-class parties and non-warking-class parties.
When working-class parties, reformist social-democratic and labor
parties, are in a dominant position, welfare effort is expanded
(Williamson and Weiss, 1979; Korpi, 1983). Inversely, when right-
wing parties, representing non-working classes, are in power, social
expenditures are restricted (Castles and McKinlay, 1979; Hicks and
Swank, 1984). The final element of the model is the dependency
of working-class parties on working-class mobilization (labor
unions). The electoral success of a working-class party increases
with the degree of labor-force unionization.
Several writers (Myles, 1984; Hicks and Swank, 1984) take
issue with the last proposition of the social democratic model.
Working-class mobilization may playa direct role, independent of
its support of political parties, in the development of the welfare
state. By increasing labor costs, unions can create an environment
that forces the state to assume the cost of deferred wages. The
private sector, confronted with higher labor costs, pressures the
state to assume these increased costs in the form of deferred wages
(social programs). As the bargaining power of unions increases so
does the pressure on the state to increase the level of deferred
wages.Tndependent of" tlie-'party composition of the government,
The assumption of this model is tha t all welfare-state
programs are rooted in some form of class-conflict, either electoral
or labor-management bargaining, and are supported by the working
class and opposed by the non-working class. A case can be built
that not all programs invoke conflicting class interests. For
example, pension policy may not have met strong opposition from
employers (Espring-Andersen, 1981). Nor did workers'
compensation represent a radical break in pre-welfare-state policy,
but a pooling of individual employers' risk (Flora and Alber,
1981:51). Hence the dynamic described by the model and the set of
predictions made may apply to only a subset of welfare state
programs and not the welfare state overall.
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Recently, social scientists have turned to more state-centered
explanations of public policy and social expenditures (Weir and
Skocpol, 1983; Hage and Hanneman, 1980; DeViney, 1983). This
explanation of the welfare state arises from a rethinking of the
state relative to its social and economic surroundings. The state is
no longer conceived as completely dependent upon either general
social-structural characteristics or the distribution of political
power among economic classes. Instead, the state itself is seen as a
source of unique interests and resources for achieving those
interests (Skocpol, 1979:30).
To fully understand public policy, the state structure in
which it is formed should be taken into account (Weir and
Skocpol, 1983; Hage and Hanneman, 1980). The state, in this view,
may enact social programs when political demands are absent.
Also, the state may, if structured in certain ways, resist the
demands of politically powerful groups. "Weak state organizations
may not be able to organize social welfare effort even if they are
predisposed to do so; strong states may use their capacity to
implement or to prevent implementation of social welfare
programs" (Rage and Hanneman, 1980:48).
A major characteristic of the state presented as related to the
welfare state is the degree of state centralization. Cameron (1978)
reports a positive link between centralization and expansion of the
public sector. He argues that a centralized state is better able to
muster resources and resist attempts to limit expansion. A similar
case for linkage between centralization and social expenditures has
been made by Wilensky (1975, 1981). A centralized state, according
to Wilensky, is better able to tax and hence gain the resources to
support the welfare state. At the same time the centralized state is
better a ble to resist local pressures that run counter to the interests
of the state.
... "Of" course, this' assumes ithat those who hold command
positions within centralized state structures favor the welfare state
(Lockhart, 1984:343-344). Centralization may take on different
connotations in the context of different policies
(Heidenheimer, et a l., 1983:5). Centralized systems are
characterized by patterned negotiations and are able to resist
outside demands for change. Health care and public pensions are
policy sectors which illustrate that centralization is a factor in
limiting programs. Comparisons of expenditures in the United
Kingdom and Sweden show that the decentralized, county-based
planning system of Sweden was unable to limit costs (Anderson,
1972; Heidenheimer, et al., 1983). Centralized states, however,
were found to be able to resist the pressures of a highly unionized
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environment to improve public pensions (DeViney, 1984). Hence
we should not expect centralization to have the same influence in
all policy areas.
MEASURES
The three models of the welfare state will be applied to one
indicator of overall social welfare effect and indices of income
policy in five risk areas. The indicator of overall social welfare
effect is total expenditures on Social Security as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product in 1975 (ILO, 1981). This is an inclusive
measure of social welfare programs that incorporates the five risk
areas covered by the program indices. The indicator has been
widely used in previous research (for example, Wilensky, 1975,
1981; Aaron, 1967; Williamson and Weiss, 1979; DeViney, 1984). It
also serves as a baseline to which results can be compared.
The measures of subsectors are Esping-Andersen's (1981)
indices of "de-commodification". De-commodification can be
defined as the extent to which individuals, or families, can uphold
claims to a given standard of living regardless of their position in
the labor market" (Esping-Andersen, 1981:2). The indices measure
the ability of programs to maintain living standards when workers
are forced out of the labor market due to old-age, disability, work-
related injury, illness, or unemployment. The indices are the
entitlement ratio (the proportion of relevant population covered)
multiplied by the earnings-replacement ratio (gross benefits as a
proportion of gross average production worker's income). Hence the
indices are measures of the extent of population covered and the
amount of benefits provided for each risk area. A score of 1
means that 100 percent of the population is covered and the
benefits replace 100 percent of Income," It should be noted that
these indices are measures of policy and 'not expenditures. These
data are available for eighteen nations.5
Two elements of the industrialization model are included in
the analysis: the percentage of the labor force employed in non-
agricultural sectors as the indicator of economic structure, and
percentage of total population age 65 or older as the indicator of
program need (OECD, 1982).6 The measure of working-class power
in the government is the percentage of legislative seats held by
parties that are members of the Socialist International (Mackie and
Rose, 1983). The indicator is restricted to these parties as a means
of providing a limited degree of ideological agreement within the
category. The measure of working-class mobilization is organized
labor as a percentage of the labor force (Taylor and Jodice, 1983:
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Sectoral Models of the Welfare State
Table 2.9). The element of the third model included in the analysis
IS the degree of government centralization measured by the
percentage of total government revenue raised by the central
government (OECD, 1979).
ANALYSIS
Th~ an~lys.is proceeds by means of regressions on each of the six
pol~cy indices, In this way we can determine the influence of
variables from the three models on each subsection of the welfare
state as well as on overall level of development. But first an
overview of the: bivariate correlations among the poli~y indices
(Table. 1) pr?vI.des some evidence of diversity among program
subsections within the welfare state.
The correlations between expenditures and individual risk
policies show a wide range. The strongest correlation with
expenditure is with policy covering loss of income due to illness.
Much weaker correlations are reported between expenditures and
the other four program areas. Hence, overall social expenditures
need not serve as an indicator of all program areas subsumed by
the term "welfare state". A similar range of relationships is
rep.orted ~or th~ ~orrelations among subunits of policy indices.
ThIS provides 11J?Ited. evidence. for the independence of policy
Intended to allevI~te diff'erent risks, A nation that has a high level
of coverage and Income replacement for one risk area may not
have a correspondingly high coverage for other risk areas.
Welfare-state programs do not develop in a uniform manner and
the use of a single indicator may mask program differences.
The regression results are presented in Table 2. The first
equation to be reviewed is that predicting level of expenditure.
The results are in line with previous research reporting social
welfare effort to be a function of need (for example, ·WIlensky,
1975). The on.ly stron~ predictor of expenditures is the percentage
of the population that IS age 65 or older. Variables from the other
two perspectives fail to provide an explanation for variable
expenditures. From this equation, an argument can be made that
overall social expenditure is an apolitical response to societal needs:
the greater the number of the aged, the greater the amount
allocated. t? social programs. Neither state structures or working-
class political strength exercise an influence on the summary
indicator of welfare-state development.
. A different and more complex set of relationships between
predictors and the welfare state is presented in the equations
explaining individual policy elements of the welfare state. No one
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factor explains a dominant amount of variance in all programs; nor
does a single variable or set of variables have a consistent
relationship with all subsectors. Elements of all three models play
a role in explaining public pension (old-age) policy. The strongest
predictor is still the percent of population age 65 or older, but the
explanatory strength of this variable is reduced. Also the
connotation of the variable, in this context, shifts from a measure
of need to a possible measure of demand. It should be kept in mind
that the dependent variable is not amount expended for old-age
pensions but the level of benefits and the proportion .of the
population covered. An increase in the number of elderly WIll thus
lead to increased expenditures for public pensions at any benefit
level; however, an increase in the number of the elderly need n~t
lead to an automatic change in policy (Myles, 1984:18). In this
context the elderly either become a political force (Pampel and, . .
Williamson, 1985) or are perceived by policy makers as a political
force (Myles, 1984). Hence, a larger number of the elderly results
in an increased political pressure for better pension policy.
Added evidence for a political influence on pensions is found
in the remaining variables. An organized working class creates an
environment that is supportive of higher pension coverage and
benefits, but working-class participation in the government. is n~t
related to benefits.7 A centralized government is able to resist this
political pressure and restrict the level of benefits and coverage of
pension policy.
Disability policy is a consequence of working-class political
pressure. Both the degree of unionization and the strength of
working-class parties serve as nearly equal predictors of policy in
this risk area. Neither state structure as measured by
centralization nor general level of economic development,
including population age distribution, has an important effect on
disability policy. .'.
None of the three models provide an adequate predictor of
unemployment policy. The overall fit of this equation (R2=.293) is .
poorer than the other policy equations. No independent variable
reaches a level of statistical significance or substantive importance.
Previous research on unemployment policy reports that this area is
the most deviate from the conclusions of traditional social policy
analysis (Alber, 1981:178) and least related to other program areas
(Coughlin and Armour, 1983:186). Hence, factors outside the
framework of the three models included in this analysis should be
investigated as sources of unemployment policy.
Workers' compensation policy is largely a response to the
environment created by a mobilized working-class. This is also the
12
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only policy for which the distribution of the labor force, our
~easure of ge?eral economic development, has a significant
Influence. ThIS result is in agreement with Flora and Alber's
(1981:5~) disc~ssion of the introduction of workers' compensation.
Industrial accidents are viewed by employers as an inevitable
~le~e.nt of industr!a~ .prod~ction and employers' desire to replace
individual responsibility WIth a shared liability: the greater the
degree of in.dustrial~zation,the greater the need to shift liability.
The f'inal pOlICY examined is income replacement for those
who are sick or ill. This last equation most resembles the first
equa!ion predicting overall welfare effort. The single significant
predictor of the replacement of income due to loss or illness is the
~ercentage of population age 65 or older. In the context of an
Income replacement measure, this is a perplexing result. Assuming
~hat the aged are. co.vered by some form of pension program, an
~llness may result In Increased expenditures by the individual, but
Illne~s should not result in a loss of income source. Therefore, a
relatively large number of elderly should not serve as the basis of a
need for this f~rm of policy. The lack of a need on the part of the
e.lderly for this program also limits the interpretation of this
linkage as a respon~e to a poli tical demand by, or on behalf of, the
eld~rly: Perhaps Improvement in income components of health
pOII.C~ IS a result of a general improvement of health policy due to
poli t ical ~emands by the elderly. Evidence for a political
mterpretatron of this policy is found in the moderate but
statistically insignificant, relationship with unionization. '
CONCLUSIONS
The results provide strong support for the argument that models of
the welfare state in general do not apply to all subsectors of
welfare-state policy. Factors associated with one subsector irieed ~
not be ~ssociated with other subsectors; nor do factors from one
model display a c~nsistent set of relationships across program areas.
The economic development model best explained general level
of development as measured by total expenditures as a percentage
of Gross Domestic Product. The element of the model that best
predicted level of development was the age distribution of the
population, On this basis, one could conclude that the welfare state
IS a response to societal needs, particularly the needs of an aging
population. But a different image is presented in the analysis of
the subsectors.
The age distribution of the population did show a
relationship with policy intended to alleviate the risks of old-age
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1. Welfare state is defined as a system of government programs
intended to insure minimum standards of living and income.
Programs included in this category are not restricted to non-
contributory.
2. These three models are not the only explanations of the welfarerstate that have been put forth. For a more complete listing ~
explanations and models, see Lockhart (1984). The study IS
7. The correlation between unionization and socialist strength is
.417; hence, determining the individual influence of the two
indicators is difficult.
6. The equations were also estimated with Gross National Product
per capita (Taylor and Jodice, 1983) substituted for percentage
of the labor force in non-agricultural sectors. This was intended
to test the relationship between the ability of a nation to support
programs and level of programs. The results (not reported) did
not differ significantly f'rorn those found in this research.
restricted to the three models since they have dominated
previous comparative research.
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4. To reduce the number of decimal places in tables, the
decommodification scores were multiplied by 100.
5. The restriction of the analysis to only industrialized, capitalist
nations does present a conservative test of the economic
development model. But the social democratic model is a theory
. of variation in those nations and is not a theory intended to be
applicable to all na tions (Myles, 1984). Previous cross-sectional
research on the welfare state as a whole, restricted to developed
nations, has been supportive of the economic development model
(For example, Wilensky, 1975, 1981). Therefore, we should not
expect the limited number of cases to present an extreme
problem. Small sample studies of comparative public policy
have been criticized in the past because of the extreme influence
of one or two cases on resul ts (Shalev, 1983). Regression
diagnostic techniques (see, Belsley et al., 1980) failed to detect
any cases having an undue influence on results.
3. The nations included in the analysis are: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
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and illness. Given that the indicators were of policy and not
expenditures, these two relationships lend themselves to an
interpretation of policy not as a response to needs of the elderly,
but the response to the elderly as a political group demanding
increased coverage and better benefits. General level of economic -
development, the other element of the first model, was linked only
to workers' compensation policy.
The social democratic model was found to be strongly linked"
to programs intended to cover the risks of old-age, disability., .and
work-related injury. The explanatory power of a .mo~IIIzed
working class and participation of workin? class parties I~. the
government shifted from policy area to .pollcy. are~.. A m?blllzed
working class was related to old-age pensions, disabifity POlICY, and
workers' compensation, while participation in the government was
related to disability policy. Given the correlation between the two
elements of the social democratic model, a quantitative approach
can not disentangle the relative effects of the two analytical
concepts. More detailed analysis of cases would ~~ required to
determine if policy in these areas IS the result of politrcal pressures
from working-class parties or a response to the demands by or the
environment created by an organized and mobilized working class.
State centralization was only related to old-age pension
policy: a centralized state is able to resist the pressures of the a.ged
and unions to improve public pension policy. Sta te structure. f'ailed
to explain any other policy area, and all three models Failed to
explain unemployment.
As a result of this research we should move away from
analyses that seek to explain the welfare state as a unif.ied ent!ty.
Research using a single measure of welfare-state benefits, pOlICY,
or expenditures may mask the dynamics of individual programs.
Alternatively, more detailed analysis of individual programs and
-poiiclcs is nee-ded.
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